Aerospatiale gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to provide a resolution to conflicts over which procedures and methods litigants in American courts should use to secure evidence from abroad. Given the differences which exist between common law and civil law legal systems, as will be discussed, problems inevitably arise when evidence sought in American lawsuits is physically located in a foreign sovereign's territory. The Hague Evidence Convention resulted from a desire to accommodate the competing interests of the signatory nations. 5 In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court provided its view as to the extent to which the treaty's drafters achieved their goal.
I. Ta HAGUE EVIDENCE CONVENTION
Treaty delegates to the Hague Evidence Convention adopted a final draft as a result of the 11th Session's comprehensive revision of the 1954 Hague Convention Chapter II rules governing letters rogatory and the taking of evidence in foreign countries. 6 The U.S. Senate gave its advice and consent on February 1, 1972. 7 The Hague Evidence Convention became effective in the United States as positive law on October 7, 1972. 8 France joined as a signatory to the treaty on October 6, 1974. 9 The Hague Evidence Convention establishes three avenues by which to obtain evidence located in foreign countries:
1. Letters of Request; 10 2. Commissioners;" and 3. Diplomatic, or consular officials.' 2 The most controversial provisions to date, and to which United States courts have directed most attention, are Articles 23 and 27, which allow signatory countries to declare their own exceptions to the Hague Evidence Convention procedures. Article 23 permits a signatory to refuse to issue letters of request for purposes of obtaining "common law-style" pretrial discovery. 13 Article 27 allows signatories, subject to international agreements, to permit by internal law or practice, 15 This method has become a primary means of obtaining foreign evidence from recalcitrant witnesses. '6 The Hague Evidence Convention is the first multilateral agreement to codify methods for taking evidence via commissioners. 1 7 By way of declaration, the individual signatory nations may limit use of commissioners to a."prior permission" requirement. 18 The Hague Evidence Convention, however, does not provide for the taking of evidence by an officer of the signatory nation where 10. MARMI)ALM-HUBBEIL, supra note 8, pts. 13-14. 11. Id. pt. 14. 12. Id.
Id.; see infra note 67 (text of Article 23).
14. Id.; see infra note 68 (text of Article 27). 15. Fai. R. Civ. P. 28(b) . A letter rogatory is: "A formal communication in writing, sent by a court in which an action is pending to a court or judge of a foreign country, requesting that the testimony of a witness resident within the jurisdiction of the.latter court may be there formally taken and transmitted to the first court for use in the pending action." BLAcK's LAw DicTiONARY 815 (5th ed. 1979 16. Comment, supra note 15, at 384, n.82. But see Hague Evidence Convention, arts. 12, 23 (In its declarations made pursuant to these articles, France has declared it will refuse to issue Letters of Request for pretrial discovery "common law-style").
17. Id. at 381. Commissioners are persons appointed by the court of the state where the action is pending, and before whom depositions can be taken in a foreign country. Report of the U.S. Delegation, supra note 6, at 806. See also FED. R. Crv. P. 28(b)(2) (providing for depositions to be taken outside of U.S. for use in U.S. cases).
18. Comment, supra note 15, at 382.
the evidence is located. Because consular and diplomatic officials in most civil law signatory countries already have authority to obtain evidence, 19 to so provide in the treaty would be superfluous. As amended, the Federal Rules, however, authorize consular officials in the country in which depositions are to be taken to administer oaths. 20 Thus, in at least one respect, the Federal Rules honor foreign judicial sovereignty.
' III. COMMON LAW VERsus CIvI: LAW APPROACHES TO OBTAINING EVIDEINCE IN INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION
The significance of the .various procedures becomes apparent upon examination of the differences between common law and civil law approaches to the discovery of trial evidence. Evidence sought through discovery methods in the United States (a common law country), for example, need not be admissible at trial, so long as "the information sought appears reasonably to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence." 22 The wide scope afforded American discovery, however, has been described by foreign tribunals as allowing "fishing proceedings."23
In contrast, most civil law countries put discovery oversight in the hands of judges. For example, France "reject[s] the suggestion that such a critical function of the court be entrusted to the parties themselves." 2 Moreover, many countries, including France, have reacted to the broad United States discovery efforts by enacting "blocking statutes" 25 to impose criminal as well as civil penalties upon citizens who allow the removal of evidence from the country. 26 These statutes "are designed to take advantage of the foreign govemnment compulsion defense.., by prohibiting the disclosure, cop- ying, inspection or removal of documents located in the territory of the enacting state in compliance with orders of foreign authorities." 27 Given these differences between various foreign judicial systems, "[flew issues have engendered more friction in the international legal community than the extension of the United States legal system beyond its borders during pretrial discovery." ' 2 This international tension heightens the need for American courts to give due deference to the Hague Evidence Convention. Applying the Federal Rules to extraterritorial evidence requests means extending American judicial authority beyond the borders of the United States, without respect for foreign sovereignty interests, and disregards the roles of judges and other officials in civil law countries. foreign defendants justifies the exclusive authority of the Federal Rules, including the authority to compel discovery. 33 Thus, the stage had been set for the Supreme Court in Aerospatiale to settle the splits of lower court authority.
V. Tim CASE

A. Facts
The French defendants, petitioners to the Supreme Court of the United States, are corporations owned by the Republic of France. 3 4 They design, manufacture, and market aircraft. 35 In the instant case, one of defendants' planes crashed in Iowa, injuring the pilot and a passenger.
36
B. Procedure
After the air crash, three people brought separate suits in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Iowa. 37 Plaintiffs based their actions on product defect liability, negligence, and breach of warranty theories. 38 The parties consented to the consolidation of the actions, which were then heard by a magistrate.
39
Without protesting the District Court's exercise of personal jurisdiction, the French corporate defendants answered the complaints. 40 They also responded to initial discovery requests made pursuant to the Federal Rules. 41 Later, however, the French defendants moved for a protective order when the plaintiffs served a second request for production of documents, a set of interrogatories, and requests for, admission made pursuant to Federal Rules 34, 33, and 36, respectively. 42 In moving for a protective order, the defendants asked the District Court to recognize the Hague Evidence Convention provisions as the exclusive procedure by which pretrial discovery could be conducted, In addition, defendants argued they were unable to respond to non-treaty discovery requests, alleging to do so would subject them to criminal peiaties under French law. 43 The French blocking statute prohibits, inter alia, any French party from disclosing commercial documents "with a view to foreign judicial or administrative proceedings .... "44 The Magistrate denied the defeddants' motion on the ground that allowing the Hague Evidence Convention to supersede the Federal Rules would "frustrate the courts' interests" in enforcing American discovery rules. . According to the Magistrate, granting a motion for a protective order would interfere with protecting United States citizens who suffer injury from harmful products. 6 The Magistrate noted that the strong United States interest in protecting its citizens outweighed any "burden" placed on a foreign corporation which might be required to produce documents. 47 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit denied the defendants' petition for a writ of mandamus on the ground that the U;S. District Court's personal jurisdiction foreclosed the possibility of requiring the Hague Evidence Convention procedures to govern the pretrial discovery. 48 The Eighth Circuit court held that personal jurisdiction conferred upon the court the authority to require the litigants to pursue discovery through the Federal Rules only, despite the evidence requested being physically within the foreign signatory nation's territory.
49
C. The Supreme Court's Holdings
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari, 50 and in a five-to-four decision held that the Hague Evidence Convention 43. But see, Batista, supra note 26, at 66-67 (the legislative history of this "blocking statute," indicates the French legislature never intended actually to impose criminal sanctions).
44. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2546 n. does apply to requests for information from foreign corporate parties in litigation. 51 The Court, however, ruled the Hague Evidence Convention does not provide exclusive or mandatory procedures by which evidence located within the territory of foreign signatory nations may be obtained. 52 Further, the Court held that litigants need not even make "first resort" to the Hague Evidence Convention procedures before enlisting those authorized by the Federal Rules. 3 Finally, the Court found the Hague Evidence Convention does not deprive a district court from exercising its authority over foreign defendants to produce evidence physically located within the foreign party's nation.
5 4 The Supreme Court vacated the Eighth Circuit's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. 55 
VI. THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE HAGUE EVEDENCE CONVENTION
GovERNs ExTRAT RxRu OiAL DISCOVERY: TE COURT'S FOUR
OPTIONS
The Supreme Court noted in Aerospatiale that at least four possible interpretations could be made in determining -the interaction between the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules. 56 The majority broke down the four options into two groups. The first group presumes the Hague Evidence Convention by its own terms governs extraterritorial discovery, 57 without considering foreign sovereignty interests. At one extreme, the text of the treaty could be interpreted so as to supersede all other methods of discovery requests. 5 8 At a lesser extreme, the treaty's language could be interpreted to require litigants make first use of the Hague Evidence Convention 59 before utilizing the Federal Rules on discovery.
The second couplet of possible interpretations considers principles of international comity6 as a guide to judicial enforcement of the 60. "Comity," in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1895), cited with approval in Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2555 n.27.
Hague Evidence Convention's procedures. 6 International comity then dictates "first resort" be made to the Hague Evidence Convention procedures in all cases (despite the provisions being strictly optional pursuant to the terms of the treaty). Lastly, the treaty could be viewed as an undertaking among sovereigns to facilitate discovery, thus protecting litigants' interests in fully preparing cases. As such, an American court should resort to the Hague Evidence Convention when the court deems that course of action to be the most just, after considering the situations of the parties as well as the interests of the concerrned foreign state. 62 The majority in Aerospatiale adopted this case-by-case approach option.
Discussing all foir interpretations of the relationship between the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules, the Court conceded that the Convention, even by the treaty's own provisions, must at least apply to the taking of evidence abroad. The majority overruled the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on this point and stated "the Hague Evidence Convention does 'apply' to the production of evidence in a litigant's possession in the sense that it is one method of seeking evidence that a court may elect to employ" 63 in cases involving evidence located abroad.
A. Textual Arguments
With respect to the two options based on textual interpretations, the Court examined the specific wording of the Hague Evidence Convention.
Hague Evidence Convention as providing the exclusive means for obtaining extraterritorial evidence.
In a recent case similar to Aerospatiale, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in In Re Anschuetz reasoned that any intention by the treaty drafters to establish the Hague Evidence Convention procedures as the exclusive means of discovery would have been explicitly stated in the treaty's language. 64 The Supreme Court majority adopted the 61. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2550. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' analysis and dismissed petitioners' argument in Aerospatiale that plaintiffs must pursue discovery through the Hague Evidence Convention procedures to the exclusion of the Federal Rules. 65 Instead, the Supreme Court found that the permissive rather than mandatory language in the text of the treaty demonstrated the Hague Evidence Convention was intended to provide optional procedures to be used only under certain circumstances." The majority stressed the permissive language of Articles 2367 and 27.68 Additionally, the majority found the Hague Evidence Convention Preamble's permissive language "particularly significant in light of the same body's use of mandatory language in the Preamble to the Hague Service Convention. ' 69 The Service Convention 7° predates, and serves as a model for, 71 the Evidence Convention; therefore, the Court reasoned, the Evidence Convention drafters could have followed the Service Convention's "shall apply" language if they so intended:2
The dissent agreed with the majority opinion in two respects. 73 One, the dissenters found the majority to be correct in rejecting the Hague Evidence Convention as the exclusive means of procuring evidence from abroad. Two, the dissenters agreed that the treaty at least applies to most discovery requests. 74 Ioterpretation of a multilateral treaty lies at the heart of Aerospatiale. Interestingly, however, the Court did not refer to the Vienna 
Id.
Convention on the Law of Treaties. 75 During 1969, the delegates to the Vienna Convention unanimously voted to adopt the proposed articles relating to treaty interpretation. 7 6 These Vienna Convention articles -establish a hierarchy of considerations to be taken into account in interpreting treaties, 77 and lend support to the Court's primary focus on treaty text. According to the Vienna Convention, tribunals interpreting treaties must give foremost deference to the ordinary meaning of the terms of the agreement. 78 Only after looking to the text of a treaty can interpretations take into account the parties' subsequent agreements, application practices, anid any relevant rules of international law. 79 Legal Counsel for the British-Foreign and Cofimonwealth Office has noted the unanimous vote to adopt the textual approach to treaty interpretation "represents a clear affirmation by the international community that, for purposes of treaty interpretation, prime emphasis must be placed on the text of the treaty as representing the authentic expression of the will of the parties." He also declared, "[a]ny changes in the details of internal United States practice will be minimal, while the assistance to United States courts and litigants in other nations will be enlarged. 8 3 In Aerospatiale, the Court acknowledged the view propounded by the United States delegation that the Hague Evidence Convention sought "to establish a system for obtaining evidence abroad that would be 'tolerable' to the state executing the request and would produce evidence 'utilizable' in the requesting state. '8 4 In addition, according to the State Department, the Hague Evidence Convention "provides a set of minimum standards with which contracting states agree to comply. ' 8 5 Yet, neither the Aerospatiale opinion nor the Hague Evidence Convention reports indicate the degree to which the United States government's interpretation accurately reflects a consensus view of the intent among the signatory states. The Aerospatiale opinion failed to respect what the delegations from other countries intended the treaty to be. As parties to the agreement, the signatories and their intent prove relevant to the interpretation analysis as a fundamental element of contract law.
The Aerospatiale Court had notice of competing concerns among the signatories regarding their intent in adopting the Hague Evidence Convention. Four of the nine amicus curiae briefs in Aerospatiale were filed by governments of signatory nations. Three of these countries, France, Germany, and Switzerland, expressed the view that the Hague Evidence Convention was designed to be the exclusive means by which signatory nationals could obtain extraterritorial evidence. 6 The United Kingdom argued that the Hague Evidence Convention only required "first resort" to its provisions. 7 Despite signatory views to the contrary, the Court persisted in placing primary emphasis on the literal language of the Hague Evidence Convention, buttressed only by considerations of the United States government's intent. By ignoring the intent of the other parties to the Hague Evidence Convention, the Court violated a fundamental principle of international contract law, 8 while treating lightly the sovereignty interests of the signatory countries.
Although briefly acknowledging the general international law principle that a treaty's history, including negotiations, and final adopted construction may be relevant to treaty interpretation, 8 9 the majority' did not analyze Aerospatiale pursuant to these generally accepted rules. With its analysis of the treaty's text, the majority again also disregarded Supreme Court precedent. 90 The Aerospatiale majority offered little explanation for discounting non-textual considerations in interpreting the treaty.
Hague Evidence Convention as requiring first, but not exclusive, use of its procedures.
The majority opinion in Aerospatiale left unclear its reasons for rejecting the position that the Hague Evidence Conventi6n, by the treaty's terms, requires that at least "first resort" be made to the document's procedures. Departing from its four-interpretation analysis, the majority simply voiced disagreement with the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' ground for rejecting petitioners' "first resort" argument. 91 Convinced that American courts ordering discovery which 359-60 (1934) (noting that "IWihen the meaning of a treaty is not clear, recourse may be had to the negotiations, preparatory works, and diplomatic correspondence of the contracting parties to establish its meaning.").
91. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2554. a foreign court had refused to produce under the treaty provisions would greatly violate the foreign tribunal's sovereignty, the Court of Appeals refused to require litigants to employ first the Hague Evidence Convention procedures 2 Providing little explanation for its conclusion, the Supreme Court majority expressed confidence that foreign tribunals will recognize that the final -decisions, regarding evidence to be used in American court cases, must be made by American courts.9 Just as summarily, the majority ruled concern over the potential need to order the production of evidence from abroad should not affect American court's decisions.
94
The dissenting opinion, on the other hand, did briefly address the second text-based argument initially listed but not discussed by the majority. According to the dissent, litigants should utilize the Hague Evidence Convention as a favored method. Although the dissenters stopped short of adopting a per se rule of "first resort," 95 they would require a trial court to refrain from requiring the use of the treaty's procedures only when no evidence located in a foreign country would be produced. 96 The dissenters maintained the treaty provisions themselves in most cases serve to resolve conflicts between the Hague Evidence Convention and the Federal Rules. 97 Thus, reasoned the minority, American courts usually need not resort at all to comity principles. 98 Moreover, the dissenters observed that had the parties to the Hague Evidence Convention expected the treaty would not be utilized as the normal means of requesting extraterritorial evidence, the signatories would have had no incentive to ratify it. 99 Although neither the dissenters nor the majority acknowledged the Vienna Convention, that treaty clearly recognized this expectation of parties to an international agreement.'00 tioners' argument that the Court uphold an automatic "first resort" rule in extraterritorial discovery request cases. Citing Federal Rule 1, which mandates procedures be-enforced to ensure inter alia the speedy resolution of legal disputes, the Court declared requiring first use of the Hague Evidence Convention's letter of request procedures would be "unduly time consuming and expensive."' 01 The dissent, however, rejected the majority's.assumption as being mere speculation unsupported by the record.'2 Furthermore, Justice Blackmun wrote: "Unless the costs become prohibitive, saving time and money is not such a high priority in discovery that some additional burden cannot be tolerated in the interest of international goodwill. Certainly discovery controlled by litigants under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is not known for placing a high premium on either speed or costeffectiveness."' 0 3 The dissent, however, did not provide examples of what would constitute "prohibitive" costs, nor did-it elucidate what recourse may be taken against a party attempting to make costprohibitive discovery requests.
Despite declaring a comity analysis unnecessary absent a conflict of laws left unresolved by the terms-of the treaty,'0 4 the dissenting opinion discussed at length the importance of honoring the sovereignty interests of signatory countries. 08 Requiring use of the Hague Evidence Convention provisions serves to uphold these sovereignty interests, according to the dissent, because. the signatory nations' ratification of the treaty signifies their consent to be governed by it.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun wrote: "The [Hague Evidence] Convention serves the long-term interests of the United States in helping to further and to maintaihi the climate of'cooperation and goodwill necessary to the functioning of the international legal and commercial systems."'1 6 According to the dissent, use of the Hague Evidence Convention meets the United States interest in providing litigants with effective procedures by which to obtain extraterritorial evidence, 107 while at the same time respects the differences between common law and civil law-style discovery methods. 108 More broadly, the dissent maintained enforcement of the use of the Hague Evidence Convention procedures "will avoid foreign perceptions" of unfairness Nowhere in Aerospatiale did the Supreme Court consider its holding in an earlier case, that "[c]onsiderations which should govern the diplomatic relations between nations, and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that their obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and reciprocity between them.""1 0 International law imposes, on parties to international agreements, a positive duty of good faith, regardless of the exact language of the text." 1 The United Nations has declared every nation "has a duty to fulfil in good faith its obligations under international agreements valid under the generally recognized principles and rules of international law."" 2 Similarly, the American Law Institute has stated "[a]n international agreement is binding in accordance with its terms and each party has a duty to give them effect . . .. "I" The Vienna Convention also expressly recognized a duty of good faith to be exercised in upholding international agreements." 4 The Supreme Court in Aerospatiale simply failed to honor these fundamental and widely respected principles of international law.
International comity principles as requiring 'first resort" to the Hague Evidence Convention only in certain circumstances.
In declining the petitioners' "proposed general rule" that "first resort" must always .be made to the Hague Evidence Convention procedures, the Supreme Court, however, did recognize notions of international comity require in each case, "a more particularized 109. Id. at 2568. 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation Among States With the Charter of the United Nations (Resolution 2625 (XXV), adopted on October 24, 1970), reprinted in 9 ITr'iL LEm4x MATmuLs 1292, 1297 (1970). UNIm STATES SEcoNs § 138 (1965) .
RESTATE ENT OF FoamGN R.ArioNs LAW Op TnE
"If an orderly system of international legal relations is going to be effective it must have as a postulate that the parties to an international agreement commit themselves in good faith to carry out its terms. This has been recoinized from the beginning of the development of interhational law." Id. comment a.
114. See The Vienna Convention, supra note 75, art. 26.
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analysis of the interests of the foreign nation and the requesting nation.""1 5 Surely, to proceed otherwise would render the treaty practically meaningless. For guidance, the majority relied on the Restatement on Foreign Relations Law. According to the majority, although the Restatement "may.not represent a consensus of international views," it nonetheless provides in Section 437 relevant criteria by which to analyze comity considerations." 6 Yet, the Court never directly matched its analysis against the very criteria it cited from the Restatement.
Section 437, with regard to cbnflicts of jurisdiction, serves to illustrate the general "reasonableness" principle adopted by the Restatement in sections 402 and 403.1 7 The reporters for the Restatement noted,
[the degree of friction created by discovery requests ... and the differing perceptions of the acceptability of American-style discovery under national and international law, suggest some efforts to mod-' erate the application abroad of U.S. procedural techniques, consistent with the overall principle of reasonableness in the exercise of jurisdiction."" Thus, the five criteria of Section 437 cited by the Court" 9 should not necessarily be considered without regard for other Restatement sections.
In addition to the criteria given in Section 437, the Restatement also includes among the considerations to be weighed in the "reasonableness" balancing process:
-the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation" in question; -the importance of regulation to the international political, legal or economic system; (...) and 115. Aerospatiale, supra note 1, at 2555. Having acknowledged the Restatement Section 437 factors, the Court in Aerospatiale failed to analyze the case with any direct comparison of the Aerospatiale facts and these or any other Restatement factors pertaining to reasonableness. The Court concluded that deciding whether resort must be made to the Hague Evidence Convention remains "a matter of" prior scrutiny [by the trial court] in each case of the particular facts, sovereign interests, and likelihood that resort to those procedures will be effective." ' ' The Court's list of factors, albeit not discordant with those enumerated in the Restatement, remain considerably more general. With this case-by-case standard, the majority offered little enlightenment as to whether the Court intended to adopt or reconstrue the Restatement principles. According to the dissent, when a treaty has been negotiated to accommodate the differences between legal systems, the comity analysis set forth in the Restatement, merely adds an unnecessary layer of analysis.' 24 Even if a lower court is to be guided by the Restatement in applying the majority's case-by-case analysis, the opinion does not explain to what extent the comity factors apply. As the dissent asserted, the majority's opinion failed to direct lower courts in this regard.'21 The majority opinion thus leaves lower court judges with rather unbridled discretion in extraterritorial discovery cases.
Id.
REsTATEmNT oF
The majority concluded that "[s]ome discovery procedures are much more 'intrusive' than others". 126 Yet, the opinion rather con- fused the intrusiveness of procedures with the intrusiveness of the particular requests made pursuant to" the-procedures (be these procedures those of the Federal Rules or of the Hague Evidence Convention). The majority suggested a discovery request for production of all design specifications, drawings, and engineering plans concerning defendants' aircraft parts would be unreasonable in scope.' z 2 The Court, however, intimated that a request for responses to "simple" interrogatories or requests for admissions would not be impermissibly intrusive.'2-The illustrations given by the Court thus appear to go to the reasonableness of the extensiveness of the request, not of the procedures by which the requests are made. The amount of evidentiary information which, a litigant attempts to retrieve by way of discovery requests differs from the means by which the requesting party seeks that evidence. -Moreover, the majority left unresolved whether the Hague Evidence Convention procedures or the Federal Rules best protect litigants from unreasonable requests, however defined. The Court merely concluded:
The exact line between reasonableness and unreasonableness in each case must be drawn by.the trial court, based on its knowledge of the case and of the claims and interests of the parties and the governments whose statutes and policies they invoke.'2 A trial court's job will include exercising "special vigilance" in protecting foreign litigants from unnecessary, overly burdensome, or invidiously motivated discovery requests.1 30 As an example of a potential means of abusive extraterritorial discovery, the majority referred to the additional monetary costs attendant to transporting witnesses or documents as a possible source of abusive extraterritorial discovery requests.' Again, however,, this goes to the scope of the request more than to the means by which litigants make the request. More importantly, these types of considerations practically mirror those stated in Federal Rule 26(b)(1 In adopting this case-by-case approach with regard to such discovery processes, the majority noted: " [We] do not articulate specific rules to guide this delicate task of adjudication. 133 Recognizing the task as "delicate," however, does little to resolve the issue of the tension between the two competing sets of procedures.
In viewing the Hague Evidence Convention as representing the result of effort by the United States executive and legislative branches to advance international cooperation among sovereigns, the dissent asserted that the adopted treaty stands in the United States as "a political determination-one that, consistent with the [constitutional] principle of separation of powers, courts should not attempt to second guess.'
134 Furthermore, even assuming the majority's case-by-case test passes constitutional muster, the dissent expressed the view that the Court placed undeserved trust in courts' abilities to weigh properly the competing interests at stake in international litigation. Claiming courts suffer from a "pro-forum bias,' 1 35 the dissent found trial court judges to be "ill equipped to assume the role of balancing the interests of foreign nations with that of their own.' 1 36
Concerned with ensuring the preservation of sovereignty interests, the dissenters apparently feared the potentially excessive exercise of American judicial supervision of discovery requests in international lawsuits. Justice Blackmun expressed hope "that courts faced with discovery requests for materials in foreign countries will avoid the parochial views that too often have characterized the decisions to date.' 37 Unfortunately, particularly in light of the opiftion having ignored the Vienna Convention, the Supreme Court's endorsement of a case-by-case standard in Aerospatiale perpetuated rather than rejected these parochial views.
VII. IMPACT ON AMERICAN STATE COURT CASES
The majority directed its case-by-case standard to "American Courts" generally. 38 Yet, the plaintiffs in Aerospatiale brought their actions in a U.S. federal district court. Hence, the Court faced the task of reconciling the Hague Evidence Convention with the Federal Thus, even a state which has adopted the federal rules verbatim may find itself without authority to impose its procedural rules in lieu of the Hague Evidence Convention provisions. This situation leaves an anomalous result in states which adopt the Federal Rtles as their own rules of procedure. Aerospatiale did not address this possibility; nonetheless, this potentiality leaves plaintiffs with a precarious choice. A plaintiff seeking evidence from a party located abroad may have a better chance of succeeding in using the Federal Rules rather than the Hague Evidence Convention as the discovery means, if the action has been brought in a federal district court. Plaintiffs in state court actions run the risk of being forced to utilize the less familiar Hague Evidence Convention procedures. Time will tell whether the Aerospatiale decision will result in increased filings of extraterritorial actions in federal rather than state courts.
CONCLUSION
In Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected an interpretation recognizing the Hague Evidence Convention to be the exclusive authority governing extraterritorial discovery requests. The Court also declined to require litigants always make "first resort" to the Hague Evidence Convention procedures. In so holding, the Court has departed from the view of most state courts and federal district courts in the United States. The Supreme Court adopted a case-by-case "reasonableness" test to restrict the applicability of the Hague Evidence Convention. The Aerospatiale opinion has directed trial courts to limit applicability of the treaty to those instances when the judges find the Hague Evidence Convention would be more effective than the Federal Rules in securing evidence from abroad.
Concededly, the drafters of the Hague Evidence Convention did not unanimously agree that the treaty should preclude all other discovery rules. 43 By failing to state the treaty in express, mandatory terms, the drafters left room for judicial interpretation which may not coincide with the signatories' intentions. Evidenced by the treaty's preamble, the delegates to the Hague Evidence Convention aimed to prescribe procedures which would facilitate obtaining evidence located in foreign countries for use in litigation in the United States.'4
With Aerospatiale, the Supreme Court has not entirely precluded use of the Hague Evidence Convention, nor has the Court completely disregarded notions of iiternational comity. The Court instead has attempted to strike a balance between a litigant's interest in obtaining evidence located in a foreign country, and the sovereignty interests of signatory nations.
To say the Hague Evidence Convention procedures "apply" to cases in which a United States court has personal jurisdiction, however, does little to assist American practitioners in determining to what extent the treaty provisions govern extraterritorial discovery requests. The Court's case-by-case test only provides some broad general guidelines, and the opinion offers but a few illustrations of reasonable and unreasonable discovery attempts.
The case-by-case standard grants lower court judges the discretion to invoke the Hague Evidence Convention provisions only to the extent they mirror those of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Supreme Court's grant of substantial discretion thus leaves open the potential of the Hague Evidence Convention being rendered completely superfluous in cases brought in American courts. The United States, as a signatory nation to the treaty, should not disregard the Hague Evidence Convention provisions, because to do so greatly increases the risk of an already prevalent friction between the United States and other signatories. Aerospatiale to some degree at least has settled the controversy as to the current American judicial view. Yet, the Supreme Court's adoption of a case-by-case standard necessitates 143 . See supra notes 82-87 and accompanying text.
144. Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 2.
further common law developliieht to provide litigants who bring actions in American courts vith d clearer conception of which set of discovery procedures to utilize fil obtaining evidence from abroad.
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